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NOTE AND COMMENT
AT'l'ORNEy's !Nnru;:s'.l' IN His CASE UNDER A CoN'l'RAC'.l' FOR CoN'l'INGEN'.l'

Fi;;i;;s.-Absolute protection for an attorney who has given services in a
cause wherein he runs the risk of receiving no compensation for his efforts
would require that he be considered as having an equitable assignment of
the specified percentage of the judgment from the filing of the first paper,
and that he have the right to carry the case through to final judgment, on
his own behalf, any desire of his client to discontinue, dismiss or compromise to the contrary notwithstanding. On the other hand, the courts frequently say that the client sliould have a maximum power of control of his
case at all times, and that compromise should be actively favored, as a
matter of public policy. There is authority for almost every conceivable
position between these extremes.
While an agreement to assist in the prosecution of a criminal charge
for a fee contingent upon conviction is invalid as against public policy, Baca
v. Padilla (N. M., 1920), 190 Pac. 730, and formerly any contract to carry
on a civil action for a contingent fee was bad, as champertous, Elliott v.
McClellattd, 17 Ala. 2o6; Slade v. Rhodes, 22 N. C. 24; Ackert v. Barker,
131 Mass. 436, at the present time it is very generally held that if there is
no fraud or undue influence at the makinK" of such contract, it is valid.
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However, in some few jurisdictions it must not expressly appear in the
contract that the attorney's services are to be gratuitous in case of failure.
2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 667. Generally the attorney must not agree
to pay the costs of the suit, Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Wis. 170, but to the effect
that this can sometimes be done, see Hassell v. Vaii Houten, 39 N. J. Eq.
105; Brown v. Bigne, 21 Ore. 26o; Be1itinck v. Franklin, 38 Tex. 458. See,
also, IO MxcH. L. REv. 490. If, as part of the contract, the client agrees
that he will not settle or compromise without the attorney's consent, the
whole contract will be held bad· as champertous, Davy v. Fidelity & Casualty
Ins. Co., 78 Ohio St. 256; Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190; Davis v. Chase, 159
Ind. 242, or the contract will be divided, and the agreement not to compromise only held void. Granat v. Kriese, II4 Ill. App. 488; Potter v. Ajar
Mfa. Co., 22 Utah 273. In a few instances the courts have indicated that
the whole contract was valid. Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Cal. 564; Taylor v.
St. Louis Transit Co., 1g8 Mo. 715; Smits v. Hogaii, 35 Wash. 290. An agreement that if the client should settle without the attorney's consent the attorney should receive a stipulated amount has been held valid. Syme v. Terry
& Tench Co. (N. Y.), 125 App. Div. 6Io. See Hall v. Orloff (Cal. App.~
1920), 194 Pac. 2g6, contra. To the effect that an agreement not to compromise may or may not be good, according to the good or bad faith of the
parties, see Lipscomb v. Adams, 193 Mo. 530. An agreement for contingent
fees in a divorce suit is void, as it is against public policy to create any
obstacle to settlement of the marital differences. M cCitr1Jy v. Dillon, 135
Mich. 678; McComiell v. McConnell, g8 Ark. 193.
If we start, then, with a valid contract between attorney and client that
the former will conduct the case either for a certain percentage of the fruits
of the litigation, or for a sum certain, contingent upon success, we have the
questions, what right or interest has the attorney in the cause of action, and
what can he do if the client seeks to dismiss, discontinue or compromise
without his consent and in disregard of his rights. Aside from special statutory provisions, his rights are fixed by the retaining lien, the charging lien
and the doctrine of equitable assignment.
The retaining lien is a product of the common Ia,v, may be general or
particular, depends upon possession, is not assignable and is passive only.
2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 970. Changes by recent statute have been
comparatively slight. Its application in the case of a contingent fee contract
is governed by the same rules as in case of a contract for a fixed and certain fee.
The charging lien is the product of statute and judicial legislation, is
particular 'only, does not depend upon possession, is sometimes assignable,
and can be actively enforced. It is equitable in nature, and is, in a way, the
arbitrary exercise of power by the court for the protection of its officer,
the attorney. 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, 975. Changes by recent
statute have been great and varied. To draw from the cases any definite
general rules as to the extent of the protection thus given the attorney is
extremely difficult, not only because of these varied statutes, but also because
the courts frequently fail to make it clear whether the compromise without
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the consent of the attorney occurred before verdict, between verdict and
the entry of judgment, or pending an appeal after entry of judgment, and
also because the courts very generally fail to make proper distinction between
the charging lien and the doctrine of equitable assignment. It is frequently
impossible to determine from an opinion whether it rests upon the one theory
or the other, or a mixture of the two. As is very ably pointed out in
Nichols v.Orr, 63 Colo. 333, the two doctrines should be distinct. Property
charged with a lien can be sold subject to the lien; under equitable assignment it can be sold only with the consent of the assignee. A lien is a charge
iepon property; an equitable assignment gives an interest in the property.
It was said in Gillette v. lJfiwphy, 7 Okla. 91, where the attorney claimed
both an equitable assignment and a lien, that these two claims were inconsistent. Under the charging lien theo.ry the attorney may have a lien upon
the judgment secured in the cause or upon the compromise settlement;
under the equitable assignment theory he should have an interest in the
cause of action and in the fruits of litigation. He can always intervene
when necessary to protect his interest under an equitable assignment; he is
sometimes permitted to intervene to protect his lien. Payton v. Wheeler,
13 Ga. App. 326.
To notice some of the more important rulings regarding the charging
lien, in the absence of a special statute providing to the contrary, the lien
does not attach until after judgment. Jacksoii v. Steams,~ Ore. 25; Hanna
v. Island Coal Co., 5 Ind. App. 163; Coi:ghlin v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co., 71
N. Y. 443 (a case much cited and often followed, but no longer accurately
representing New York law, because of statutes); Kusterer v. Beaver Dam,
56 Wis. 471; Henchey v. Chicago, 41 Ill. 136; Hietchinson, Adm'r, v. Pettes,
18 Vt. 6!4; Iii re Baxter & Co., 154 Fed. 22. But there are now several
statutes, nearly all of recent date, under whicq it has been held· that the lien
attaches upon institution of the suit. Payto1i v. Wheeler, 13 Ga. App. 326;
Robertson & Cleary v. Shutt, 72 Ky. 6659; Peri v. N. Y. C. R. Co., 152 N.
Y. 521; Broadbent v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.,~ Utah 5g8; Wait v. Railroad, 204 Mo. 491. Whil~ in Farmer v. Stillwater Water Co., 1o8 Minn. 41,
it is said that the charging lien attaches upon verdict, this is denied in Tyler
v. Superior Court, 30 R. I. 107, and Cline Piano Co. v. Sherwood et al., 57
Wash. 239, where it is held that the lien does not attach until judgment is
entered. So far as the charging lien is concerned, under an ordinary statute
(if there be such a thing) it would seem that the client can settle out of
court and stop the suit at any time, but if the lien has attached it will be
protected. But if the settlement was collusive and in fraud of the attorney's
rights, some courts have been inclined to follow the suggestion in Coieghlin
v. N. Y. C, & H. R. Co., supra, and, ignoring logic and the theoretical limitations of the lien, they have e..'\:ercised an arbitrary and undefined power
and have prevented the client from dismissing or discontinuing even before
the lien has attached. Jacksoii v. Steams, ~ Ore. 25; National Exhibition
Co. v. Crane (N. Y.), 54 App. Div. 175· If the compromise occurs before
the lien has attached, no collusion being shown, the atto.mey can recover
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the reasonable value of his services on a. quantum 111emit. Badger v. Mayer,
2 Misc. Rep. 533; Re Winkler, 139 N. Y. Supp. 755.
When the compromise occurs after the lien has attached, it must be
determined what it attaches to-the judgment, if there be one, or the settlement. In many jurisdictions the attorney is entitled to the agreed' percentage
of the settlement only, Barcits v. Gates, 130 Fed. 364 (affirmed, 136 Fed.
184), and he is not entitled to the reasonable value of his services in the
place thereof. Crosby v. Hatch, 155 Iowa 312. But to the effect that he is
entitled to the agreed percentage of the judgment, especially if the settlement was collusive, see Desama1i v. Butler Bros., 118 Minn. 1g8. In some
courts the matter turns upon whether the judgment is final or not. If it is,
then the attorney is entitled to the agreed ·percentage of the judgment,
Chreste v. Louisville R. Co., 167 Ky. 75; Serwer v. Sarasoh1i, 86 N. Y. Supp.
838; if it is not, but an appeal is pending, then the amount of the settlement
controls. Corcoran v. Geo. Kellogg Structural Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 269;
Stephens v. Metropolita1i St. R. Co., 157 Mo. App. 656.
If the contract was for a fixed sum, contingent upon success, the attorney may recover only the reasonable value of his services when a compromise occurs before final judgment, Pratt v. Kerns, 123 Ill. App. 86, but in
other jurisdictions apparently he can recover the amount stipulated for.
Hall v. _Gunter, 157 Ala. 375; l1Zgersoll v. Coram, 211 U. S. 335.
If, in the compromise agreement, the opponent agrees to pay the attorney's fees for the client, there is a nice question as to whether the attorney's
percentage is to be reckoned on the basis of the amount paid the client or
on the basis of the sum total which the opponent must pay attorney and
client together. Schmitz v. S. Covington & C. St. R. Co., 131 Ky. 207; Neu
v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 99 N. Y. Supp. 290, hold that it is the former;
Sutton v. Chicago R. Co., 258 Ill. 551; J ohnso11 v. Great N orthem R. Co.,
128 Minn. 365, that it is the latter; and the latter view would seem to be
the more logical.
In a recent case, Kellogg v. Winchell (D. C., 1921), 273 Fed. 745, the
court of appeals of the District of Columbia held, when the client undertook to dismiss the attorney after judgment against him and pending an
appeal, the contract being for contingent fees, that the attorney had an
interest in the case and could prosecute it to final judgment on his own
behalf. There are many cases in accord, While it is not always so stated,
the basis for such holding should be, logically, the doctrine of equitable
assignment,-that is to say, when the attorney agrees to carry on an action
for a percentage of the recovery, or for a fixed sum contingent upon success, he becomes assignee of an equitable interest in the cause, if such cause
is assignable in his jurisdiction, and' is entitled to intervene when necessary
to protect his interest. Sometimes the courts so refer to it; at other times
they call the attorney's interest a lien. The courts of the same state frequently will call it an equitable assignment in one case and a lien in the
ne.'\:t, and permit intervention in both. In the following cases there was an
e.'\:press equitable assignment of a portion of the recovery to the attorney,
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and in each it was held good as such: Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Miller, 2I Tex. Civ. App. 609; Schubert v. Herzberg, 65 Mo. App. 578;
Dupree v. Bridgers, 168 N. C. 424. In Terney v. Wilsoii, 45 N. J. L. 282,
an express agreement that the attorney was to have a lien on the recovery
was said to amount to an equitable assignment. 2 THORNTON A'l"l'ORNEYS AT
LAW, 734-5. But other courts say that the contingent fee contract is of
itself an equitable assignment. In the following cases the above conclusion
was reached without express words of assignment: Cain v. Hockensmith
Wheel & Car Co., 157 Fed. 992; Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273;
Sivley v. Sivley, g6 Miss. 134; Weeks v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 73 Mich. 256;
Jolmson v 1 McC1trry, 102 Ga. 471; Keri~ v. Chicago, M. & P. S. R. Co., 201
Fed. 404; Burkhart v. Scott, 6g W. Va. 694; Phillips v. L. & N. R. Co., 153
Fed. 795; Griggs v. Chicago, R. I. & P.R. Co. (Neb., 1920), 177 N. W. 185;
Middlestadt v. City of Miiineapolis, 147 Minn. 186. In the following cases
the attorney's interest was called a lien, but he was allowed to intervene to
protect that interest: Fuller v. L<mztt Bleaching Co., 186 Ala. 117; Wait v.
Railroad, 204 Mo. 491; Cors01i v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 449; Schutt v. Bush, 210
Mich. 495; Payton v. Wheeler, 13 Ga. App. 326. But in Knipe v. Wheelehan,
16o N. Y. Supp. 1012, while it was recognized that the attorney had a lien
he was not allowed to continue the action in his own behalf. It is denied
by some authorities that there can be an equitable assignment without express
words of assignment. Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Ore. 88; Howard v. Ward,
31 S. D. 114- And in many jurisdictions it is denied that a contingent fee
contract, either with or without special words of assignment of a portion
of the recovery, gives any interest, legal or equitable, in the cause of action.
Weller v. Jersey City, etc., Ry., 68 N. J. Eq. 659; Gillette v. Murphy, 7 Okla.
91; Nichols v. Orr, 63 Colo. 333. See, further, 21 C. J. 343; 4 CYc. 49; 4
CYc. 1022; WEEKS, ATTORNEYS AT LAW (Ed. 2), Sec. 355; 8 MrcH. L.
REv. 328.
It is submitted that the view that an attorney has an interest in the
civil cause from its institution is sound. The objection to putting any
obstacle in the way of compromise is recognized, but since we allow the
contingent fee contract, the policy of leaving the attorney who has expended
his time, skill and money in the cause to the caprice of a fickle-minded client
who purposes to settle for "a song," in utter disregard or direct fraud of
the attorney's rights, does not appeal to one's sense of fairness, nor is it
conducive to the smooth and efficient administration of justice. As was
said in fV eeks v. Wayne Circuit J1edges, supra, "It is true that courts look
with favor upon a compromise and settlement made by the parties to a suit
with the consent of all parties concerned, to prevent the vexation and
expense of further litigation, but the rule only applies where the rights and
interests of all the parties concerned, both legal and equitable, have all been
respected, and in good faith observed. Parties cannot assume that attorneys
have no rights, without inquiry."
There is an unmistakable tendency in the direction of affording greater
protection to attorneys under contingent fee contracts, which tendency is
shown both in legislation and decision. Perhaps a good "safety valve" is

NOTE AND COMMENT

337

to be found in the suggestion of the Wisconsin court, Gowran v. Lennon,
154 Wis. 566, that the attorney should be allowed to go on with the suit. after
the client's attempted compromise, only when the client is unable at that
time to settle the attorney's claim for fees. Undoubtedly, there are some
cases in which public policy so strongly demands an absolute right on the
part of the client to settle regardless of his attorney's wishes, that nothing
can be permitted to stand in the way. Such, for instance, are cases involving
marital differences, etc. In such cases the contract for contingent fees might
be deemed valid if it were to be considered as carrying an implied condition
subsequent to the effect that the client can settle with his opponent at any
time and thus discharge the contingent fee contract with the attorney.
D.H.B.
CONTINUING T~PASS AND R.l>P.eAT:ED WRONG.-The case of Am.stutz v.
King et al., recently decided in the supreme court of Ohio, shows the difficulties under which the courts are laboring in their efforts to get away
from the conclusions of the "strong" decisions on the question of law indicated
in the title. This case has been reported without opinion, and therefore will
not be published in the Ohio State Reports until the bound volume· is put
out. It is understood that it is to appear in Volume 102, Ohio State Reports.
The notation of the court is as follows: "This case is affirmed on the
authority of Gillette v. Ttteker, 67 Ohio St. lo6 (19<>2), and Bowers v. Santee,
99 Ohio St. 361 (1919) ." The facts in the case were apparently undisputed
in the lower court. The petition of the plaintiff alleged that she employed
Dr. King and Dr. Shuffield to perform an abdominal operation on her, on
March 9, 1916. All relationship between these physicians and the patient
ceased sooii after the operation. On September 3, 1917, a gauze sponge
passed from her body, having been left in the abdomen at the time of the
operation. The petition was filed April 30, 1918. By the law of Ohio,
"Action for malpractice * * * shall be brought within one year after the
cause of action thereof accrued." G. C. II225. The petition was demurred
to on the ground that the statute of limitations had run. The lower court
sustained the demurrer and judgment was rendered against the plaintiff.
The supreme court has recently affirmed the judgment of the lower court,
four members of the coµrt concurring and three judges dissenting.
As the case is reported without opinion, we are thrown back upon the
two cases cited as precedents to determine the theory of the decision. The
case of Gillette v. T11cker (1902), 67 Ohio St. 106, is identical in its physical
facts with the instant case. In each case the surgeon in charge left a sponge
in the wound when the incision was closed. The important juridical fact
which differentiates the cases is found in the words it:i.'licized above; namely,
that in the last case the professional relations between the plaintiff and
defendant ceased soon after the time of the operation, while in the earlier
case such a relation continued up to a point of time within the year before
suit was brought. The case of Gillette v. Tucker was originally decided by
an evenly divided co·urt, thus affirming the decision of the circuit court. This
decision was in favor of Mrs. Tucker, the patient, who claimed to have been
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injured by the negligent treatment of the surgeon. The decision in Gillette
v. Tucker was later reversed iri the case of McArthur v. Bowers, 72 Ohio
St. 656 (1905). No opinion is given in this last case. The notation is simply, "Judgment reversed and that of the common pleas affirmed on the doctrine of the dissenting opinion in Gillette v. Tucker." Finally, in the case
of Bowers v. Santee_. 99 Ohio St. 36! (19r9), the court said: "We * * *
most respectfully disagree with anci' disapprove the M cArth11r case and we
approve and reaffirm the doctrine announced in the Gillette case." The
doctrine thus finally adopted by the Ohio court is that e.'Cpressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Price, at page 133 of the report, which therefore demands
a more careful consideration. Price, J., bases his argument on the case of
Perry County v. Railroad Co.,, 43 Ohio St. 45r (r885). In this case the
injury complained of was one to property, the destruction of a bridge. The
court here said: "From the time the injuries complained of were committed
* * * the duty of defend·ant to restore the bridge to its former usefulness
and safety was a continuous and subsisting obligation, and each day's failure
to make full restoration was a fresh breach of such obligation; and lapse
of time cannot avail to interpose a bar to recovery." It has been before
argued at considerable length in this REvmw (Cf. 19 MrcH. L. fuv. 38o)
that the theory of the Perry Co. case, and consequently that of all the cases
since decided in the Ohio court based upon it, is that of a "repeated" wrong,
each repetition of which constitutes a new cause of action. If the theory
of the instant case, one in which the injury is to the person, is based on the
Perry Co. case, which is one of injury to property, it is evident that the
case of Clegg v. Deardm, 12 Ad. and El. (n. s.) 575 (1848), and the long
course of decisions based on this case, including the troublesome one, The
National Copper Co. v. The Minnesota Mining Co., 57 Mich. 83 (r885), cannot be used as precedents for the instant case, because the decision in the
Perry Co. case is directly contrary to the decision of the English court in
the case of Cltrgg v. Dearde1i, supra, on the same state of facts. (Cf. r9
MrcH. L. fuv. 378.)
The question then arises whether the Ohio court has adopted a theory
of decision in this case different from that of the court in Giliette v. Tucker
and Bowers v. Santee. The significant fact in the instant case which differentiates it from the two cases above cited is that in the present case the
surgeon did not continue in charge of the case after the operation, with its
negligent inclosing of the sponge in the wound, and therefore had no opportunity after that time to correct the negligence of leaving the sponge in the
wound, hence the statute of limitations begins to run from the time when
his last act of negligence occurred and the statutory period had elapsed
before the petition was filed in the case. As this case is decided by a divided
court, and as it leaves us with a verdict in favor of the defendant instead
of with the plaintiff as in the two cases cited as precedents for this decision,
we are still confronted with the question as to what the proper ground of
decision is in such cases. In the Gillette case and in the Bowers case -the
court apparently assumes that a new cause of action arises each day that
the foreign body is left in_ the wound. This is shown by Judge Price's use
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of the Perry Co. case. And as suit is brought within a year after its removal
the plaintiff is not barred of her recovery by the lapse of the statutory period.
But in the Amst11tz case, because the surgeon ceases to treat the patient
soon after the operation, he is held responsible for the successive irritations
caused by the foreign body only up to the time when by removal of the
foreign body he might have prevented further irritation. As his last opportunity to correct his blunder was more than a year before suit was brought,
the statute was a bar to the recovery; i. e., in the Amstutz case the statute
begins to run not from the time that the last wrong was inflicted upon the
plaintiff but from the time that the surgeon had! the last opportunity to correct his original blunder.
The practical result of this decision is to put a very important limitation
upon the chance for recovery in the malpractice cases. This limitation is,
in fact, incorporated in the decision in the Gillette case and in the Bowers
case. Price, J., says in 67 Ohio St. 133: "The facts in the case at bar show
a continuous obligation upon the plaintiff in error, so long as the relatioti
of employment contin11ed." Cf. also Fronce v. Nichols, 22 0. C. C. 539, 12
0. C. D. 472 (1901); Perkins v. Trneblood, 180 Cal. 437 (1919); Miller v.
Ryerso1i, 22 Ont. Rep. 369; Calumet Blee. St. Ry. Co. v. Mabie, 66 Ill. App.
235 (18g6). The Ohio court then seems to be committed to the doctrine
that leaving the sponge in the wound is a new wrong which gives rise to a
new·cause of action, but that the last wrong for which the surgeon can be
held responsible is the one committed on the last day in which he has charge
of the case and consequently has his last opportunity to remedy the wrong,
and this seems the doctrine also of the courts above cited. On this point
they are at variance with the Pennsylvania court, which holds that "the
statute runs against an injury committed * * * from the time of the actual
discovery" of the wrong. This in a case where the injury was to land.
Lewey v. F1-ick Coke Co., 166 Pa. St. 536, 547 (1895). The holding of the
Michigan court in a malpractice case was in accord with that of the Pennsylvania court and contrary to that of the instant case on this point. Groendal v. Westrate, 171 Mich. 92 (1912). This last case was decided under a
statute which said that"the action may be commenced at any time within
two years after the person who is entitled to bring the same shall discover
that he has such cause of action," 1f the defendant shall have fraudulently
concealed the fact from the plaintiff. We are thus left with all the courts
in accord as to the doctrine of "repeated wrong" in the malpractice cases,
but at variance on the point as to whether the statute begins to run from
the date of discovery of the wrong by the plaintiff or from the date of the
last opportunity for the defendant to remedy the wrong. The more liberal
rule of the Pennsylvania and Michigan courts would seem to be more in
accordance with justice, and in close analogy to those cases in which the
statute of limitations is suspended or interrupted during the time when the
plaintiff cannot assert his right because of excusable ignorance of its existence or because of some legal bar to its assertion, as when property has
been removed from the jurisdiction and the plaintiff is ignorant of its whereabouts. Cf. Gatliii v. Vaut et al.; 61nd. T. 254, 91 S. W. 38, (1go6). This is
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none the less true when the plaintiff is in ignorance without fault on his
part than when his ignorance is caused by the fraudulent concealment of the
true state of affairs by the act of the defendant, as in the Ohio and Pennsylvania cases cited above. The plaintiff should not be barred of his right
unless he knows of its ·existence and can take legal steps to vindicate it.
As the decision in the instant case is by a divided court, it might be possible
that the Ohio court would change its ruling on this point if the issue were
squarely presented to it.
J. H. D.
LANDLORD AND TtNANT-TtRMlNA'l'ION OF TtNANcrts FROM YtAR TO Yi>AR
BY HOLDING OVER.-The plaintiff was a tenant in possession of an
office suite held under a three years' written lease at a yearly rental, payable
- in equal monthly installments. He held over for nearly thh:teen years, paying rent regnlarly. Section n812, Compiled Laws of Michigan, 1915, reads:'
"And in all cases of tenancy from year to year, a notice to quit, given at
any time, shall be sufficient to terminate said lease at the expiration of one
year from the time o:ll the service of such notice." It was held (two judges
dissenting), that the landlord could terminate the plaintiff's tenancy at the
end of the year period, without notice. The injunction asked for was refused.
Rice v. Atkinsoii, Deacon, Elliott Co. (1921), 215 Mich. 371.
In the majority opinion we find the following pertinent langnage:
"While a tenant paying an annual rental who holds over after his term has
expired with the acquiescence of his landlord is frequently called a tenant
from year to year, I am persuaded that such tenancy does not possess all
the attributes of one from year to year. * * * The question, however, is one
of authorities, and to them I shall now call attention." In considering the
authorities, the court first quotes from CYc.: "In some cases a distinction
seems to have been made between those tenancies from year to year arising
from leas~s for indefinite terms, and those arising from a holding over by
the tenan: after the expiration of a lease for a specified term. Thus, it has
been held that a tenant who occupies demised premises for several years
after the termination of his lease creates each year a new term expiring at
the close of the current year, and requiring no notice for its determination."
24 CYc. 1381. Two cases are there cited in support of that view. Adams v.
City of Cohoes, 127 N. Y. 175; Gladwell v. Holcomb, 60 Ohio St. 427. So
far as the language used by the autho.r in CYc. is concerned, it must be noted
that he said no more than that "some cases" have made a distinction. The
ne.-.;:t text-writer quoted is McAdam, and it must be conceded that he supports the view taken by the majority in the principal case. McADAM ON LANDLORD AND TtNANT (Ed. 4), p. 667. Three New York cases are cited by
McAdam in support of his view. Adams v. City of Cohoes, supra; Park v.
Castle, 19 How. Pr. 29; Rorbach v. Crossett, 46 St. R. ¢, [19 N. Y. Supp.
450]. The court next relies upon Taylo.r: "When a tenant for a year, or
any other -ascertained period, holds over without permission, no notice is
of course necessary, since, without some -fresh agreement, express or implied,
the tenancy by its own terms is at an end." 2 TAYLOR ON LANDLORD AND
TtNANT (Ed. 9), p. 52. Analysis of that statement will certainly reveal that
Cm~ATJ>D
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it is not in point. On the same page Taylor says: "A tenant for years, also,
who holds over, so as to create a tenancy from year to year, by implication
and without any specific act of recognition by the landlord, is entitled to
notice before he can be ejected!' It will be necessary to quote only a part
of the court's extract from the next text-writer: "A distinction has been
made by the authorities as to the necessity for a notice to quit between that
class of cases where the tenancy is of an indefinite duration or for an indefinite number of years, as was the universal character of these tenancies
from year to year in their original condition, and the class oi1 tenancies from
year to year which arises when a tenant holds over with the consent of his
landlord after the expiration of a definite term. * * * In theory a tenant
from year to year under an indeterminate lease has in each current year a
growing interest in the year next ensuing, which cannot be arbitrarily
destroyed by his landlord without notice to· quit. Where, however, a tenant
holds over after the expiration of a definite term, and by so doing creates
a tenancy ~rom year to year, no year of the tenancy thus created by holding
over arises out of or is connected with the year which precedes it, but each
year of the holding over creates a new and separate contract for a year
between the parties which, being for a fixed and definite period, may, according to the rule, be terminated without notice." l UNDERHII.I, ON LANDLORD
AND TENANT, p. 157· It is rather obvious that the extract from Underhill
can mean no more than that there is a division of authorities upon the
point involved. In that connection, Underhill cites two cases which support the rule and two opposed to it. Gladwell v. Holcomb, supra; Adams
v. City of Cohoes, si1pra (accord); Peehl v. Bmnbalek, 99 Wis. 62; R-0berson v. Simons, 109 Ga. 36o (contra). The court's last text citation is to the
same effect as that from Underhill. 16 Rur.ING CASE LAW n67. Gladwell
v. Holcomb and a note in 25 L. R. A. (n. s.) 849 are cited in R. C.-L. Examination of the note in L. R. A. reveals no new authorities. A few pages
beyond the court's quotation from R. C. L. appears the following: "Still,
in case of a tenancy for a term of years, if the tenant hold·s over with the
consent of the landlord, a new tenancy from year to year may arise which
will necessitate a notice to quit to terminate it." 16 R. C. L. n73.
An appraisal of the authoritative value of the above extracts from the
te..'Ct-writers will make it necessary to examine the cases cited by them. The
New York cases will be first considered. In Park v. Castle, siePra, there was
a verbal lease for one year, and the tenant held over for about eleven months,
paying rent. The landlord then gave notice that he would terminate the
lease at the end of that year. The tenant claimed the right to six months'
notice as a tenant from year to year. The court said: "There can be no
doubt but that the defendant, by holding over after the expiration of the
year for which he hired the farm, without any new agreement, but by the
permission of the plaintiff, became a tenant from year to year. The authorities agree in regard to this proposition.'' The court decid·ed that notice to
terminate at the end of the period was not necessary, but placed its decision
squarely upon its interpretation of a New York statute. "I think the term
of a tenant, from year to year, should be regarded as ended, within the
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meaning of the Revised Statutes authorizing the summary removal of tenants, at the expiration of each year he holds over the original term. It is
so, in fact, especially since no verbal contract for leasing is good for a
longer period than one year. (2 R. S., 135, §8.)" Rorbacli v. Crossett, 19
N. Y. Supp. 450, and Adams v. City of Cohoes, siipra (the most cited New
York case), are to the same effect as Park v. Castle, and they rely upon
that case as authority. The question of "notice to quit" was not directly
involved: in the case of Kennedy v. City of New York, l!)(i N. Y. 19. We
are justified, then, in dismissing the New York cases as irrelevant, in that
they were decided under a statute which the courts considered obviated the
necessity of notice to quit.
Gladwell v. Holcomb, supra, is considered to be the leading case in point.
There was a written lease for one year in that case and the tenant held over
for six years, paying rent. Four months before the end of this six years
of holding over the landlord gave notice that the tenant should quit at the
end· of the period. The court took the view that a tenancy from year to
year was created by the holding over, but that it could be term"inated without notice, advancing the theory that this sort of tenancy from year to year
was in fact successive tenancies for year periods. The court recognized
that this was a case of first instance in Ohio, and it cited no other case
squarely in point. Its decision s~ems to have been prompted by .a consideration other than that of a rule concerning notice. "If six months, or any
number of months notice, before the end of the year were required to terminate the tenancy, then, upon the failure to give such notice, a new implied
agreement, with the tenant in possession under a former one, would immediately arise, for another year commencing in the future, which could not
less certainly be obnoxious to the statute [of frauds] than an express parol
agreement for a future lease; ancf an agreement of that kind not accompanied with actual possession taken under it has been repeatedly held invalid."
The difficulty which the courts had with the Statute of Frauds, in Park
v. Castle and Gladwell v. Holcomb, seems not to have troubled most of the
courts. With reference to tenancies from year to year created by holding
over, it has been said: "Promises of this character are implied by law from
the acts of the parties, rather than from any supposed special agreement
between them. 'They do not, therefore, come within the evil of the statute
of frauds, and are commonly adjud'ged to be excepted from its operation."
Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Sayre, 75 Ala. 270.
Turning to the Michigan decisions, the court cites one case which it
considers to be directly in point. Teft v. Hinclmian, 76 Mich. 672. In that
case the tenant held under a verbal lease for two years. At the expiration
of this term the landford gave notice to quit. Tenancy from year to year
is not even mentioned in the opinion. Although it is not clear, it seems that
the court was of the opinion that the holding for the second year was valid
by reason of the verbal lease plus an actual occupation for the period of
the lease. Judge; Morse said: "The second year Hinchman was holding the
same as under a verbal lease for one year. At the end' of it he required
no notice to terminate it." What is said in a later Michigan case would
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seem to indicate that the Michigan court considers that a verbal lease for
more than a year, plus ac;tual occupation for the full period, will make a
valid lease for the full term, at least so far as to obviate the necessity of a
notice to terminate at the end of the term for which the verbal lease was
made. Barium v. Berger, 125 Mich. 504 In that case there was a verbal
lease for a five-year period, reserving a monthly rent. The tenant held
over, paying rent each month. The court said: "This was not a tenancy
from year to year. It was a tenancy continuing five years from June I,
1894, and terminating June 1, r8gg. While the agreement was not in writing,
yet it was fully performed by the parties, and therefore cannot now be
treated as a void lease." It was held that the paying of a monthly rent after
the expiration of the term created a tenancy from month to month and the
tenant was entitled: to one month's notice to quit as provided for by statute
in the case of tenancies from month to month. In Ganson v. Baldwin, 93
Mich. 217, Morse, C. J., said: "This agreement, however, as testified to by
complainant, was good for a year, and, while acquiesced in by her, the
defendant must be considered as holding from year to year. Schneider v.
Lord, 62 Mich. 141; Himtington v. Parkhurst, 87 id. 38. The defendant was
therefore entitled to a ye,ar's notice to quit." It is a very significant fact
that this statement of the rule comes from the same judge who wrote the
opinion in Teft v. Hinchnw.n, S1ipra. The cases and text-writers have not
cited Teft v. Hinchman as supporting the rule contended for in the principal
case.
Tenancies from year to year are generally held to arise in three types
of cases : 1. Expressly. 2. Where the tenant enters and holds under a lease
made void by the statute of frauds. 3. Where the tenant holds over after
the expiration of a lease for years. Teft v. Hinchman, S1&Pra, may be considered as a case of the second type, and even if the Michigan court had
expressly characterized the term in question as a tenancy; from year to year,
it could have found authority to the effect that such a tenancy initiated
under a void lease could· be terminated by either party to it, without notice,
at the time when the void lease would expire by its terms. TIFFANY ON LANDI.ORD AND TENANT, pp. 250, 251.
A distinction between tenancies from year to year, such as that made by
Underhill (see extract from Underhill, ante), on the theory that "a tenant
from year to year under an indeterminate lease has in each current year a
growing interest in the year next ensuing, which cannot be arbitrarily
destroyed by his landlord without notice to quit," would seem to be very
hard to justify, in that the right and obligation to hold for another year
comes into being by operation of law at the moment when the time for
giving the six months' notice to quit expires. The same error is found in
Gladwell v. Holcomb and 16 R. C. L., p. 1167.
It is to be regretted that the court, in the principal case, did not have
before it the opinion of the best recent text-writer. Mr. Tiffany says: "The
weight of authority is to the effect that if the previous tenancy was for one
or more yeats, the new tenancy thus created 'by implication' is, presumptively, one from year to year." TIFFANY ON LANDI.ORD AND TENANT, p. 1482.
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He cites cases from England and eightee1i of our states, including Michigan, in
support. Again: "Conceding that the new tenancy, created by a permissive
holding over, is in the particular case periodic, it can, by the weight of
authority, be determined only by notice, as ii:i the case of a similar periodic
tenancy otherwise created." Id., p. 1487. Here cases from eight states are
cited. Tiffany observes that Gladwell v. Holcom/J, snpra, is contra. Id.,
p. 1488. An examination of the cases cited' by Tiffany discloses that in all
of those jurisdictions he has really found authority for his conclusions.
Concerning the origin of tenancies from year to year, Lord Kenyon,
C. J., said in Doe v. Porter, 3 D. & E. *13: "The tenancy from year to year
succeeded to the old tenancy at will, which was attended with many inconveniences. And in order to obviate them the courts very early raised an
implied contract for a year, andi added that the tenant could not be removed
at the end of the year without receiving six months' previous notice." An
old but very high authority deciding the question raised in the principal case
is Right v. Darby (1786), l Term Rep. 159, in which Lord Mansfield, C. J.,
said: "If there be a lease for a year, and by consent of both parties the
tenant continue in possession afterwards, the law implies a tacit renovation
of the contract. They are supposed to have renewed the old agreement,
which was to hold for a year. But then it is necessary for the sake of convenience, that, if either party should be inclined to change his mind, he
should give the other half a year's notice before the expiration of the next
or any following year." In the same case. Buller, J., observes that the same
rule applies to houses as applies to lands, and with reference to notice to
quit says: "This doctrine was laid down as early as thei reign of Henry the
Eighth."
In the principal case the court might have advanced good reasons for
abrogating the well-settled rule requiring "notice to quit" in the case of
tenancies from year to year created by holding over; but if the question is
really "one of authorities," as the court stated, it is certainly difficult to
justify its decision.
G. S.
OPtRATION AND EFFECT oF RtcoRDING.-While the operation of the recording acts is not uncommonly said to result in a preference of the earlier
recorded instrument on the ground that under the circumstances the later
grantee takes "with notice," the true view in the normal case would seem
to be that the earlier grantee is preferred because priority in time gives
priority in right-and by recording, he has done all that is required to preserve that favored: position. Recording does not ordinarily give preference,
it merely safeguards priority. Reference is here made to the normal case
because it is, of course, true that there are certain special cases, not necessary to notice here, in which, independently of the recording acts, priority
in time does not necessarily give priority in right. And there are other
cases, one type of which will be discussed herein, in which it is important
to observe that reconling does give 1iotice.
If A conveys land to B, who records, and later A executes a deed of
the same land to X, B's rights are superior to X, not because X took with
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notice, but because B, without any reference to recording or the statutes,
had priority of time and therefore of right and: has not been guilty of any
omissions which might have lost him such favored position. So if A conveys lot one to B together with an easement over A's remaining lot two,
and B records, a subsequent purchaser of lot two from A takes subject to
the easement, and the reason is the same as in the case above. So, also, if
A in his deed of lot one to B creates in his favor an equity-for example, a
building restriction-in his remaining lot two, and A later confers upon X
an equitable interest-for example, by contract of sale-in lot two, B is
preferred as against X for the reason given above. There are situations in
which as between competing equities priority of time does not confer priority
of right (see AsHBURN£R, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, pp. 78, et seq.; 2 TIFFANY
ON REAL PROPERTY [Ed. 2], §566c), but the case supposed is not one of these.
But if in the last case A for value conveys to X a legal estate, the question becomes of vital importance as to whether X had "notice" of B's equitable interest in lot two. Assuming lack of actual notice or knowledge in
X, the case turns on whether he was charged with notice by the fact that
B's deed was on record. That he is not charged with notice was held in
J11dd v. Robi11so1i, 41 Colo. 222, 14 Ann. Cas. IOI8, and in Glorienx v. Liglzt/iipe, 88 N. ]. L. 199, Ann. Cas. 1917 E, 484- In these cases the ground for
the decision is that the deed to B is not in X's "chain of title"; the New
Jersey court further considering that "subsequent purchasers" as used in
the statute as to whom recording gives notice includes only subsequent purchasers from the same grantor of the same land. On the contrary, it has
been held that under the circumstances stated X is charged with notice.
Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678; King v. Union. Trnst Co., 226 Mo. 351;
Whistler v. Cole, 143 N. Y. Supp. 478. In the recent case of McQ11ade v.
Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302 (1921), the latter view was unnecessarily adopted.
The powerful support of Professor Tiffany is thrown with the latter group
of cases. 2 TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY [Ed. 2], 2188.
The apparent conflict in the cases is due to a difference of opinion as
to what is included in one's "chain of title." When it is said that one is
charged with notice of provisions in instruments properly recorded it must
be understood that such notice applies only to instruments in the "chain of
title." Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N. D. 638; Losey v. Si111Pso11, II N. ]. Eq.
246; Ra11ki1i v. Miller, 43 Iowa II.
The determination as to what is included in one'Si chain of title, whether
for the purpose of deciding the question of notice or the invalidity of a
transfer as against a subsequent grantee, mortgagee, etc., must, after all,
turn on the theory of the recording system and: the reasonableness of the
burden thrown upon the searcher of the records. Unquestionably the basic
idea of the system is the creation of a public record of instruments of title
from which a prospective purchaser of a tract of land may with reasonable
certainty assure himself as to the safety of dealing with a given person.
How far the system falls short of effecting this ideal is another story. In
the cases proposed at the beginning of this note, X, under the usual grantor•
grantee index system, presumably would find on the records a deed of lot,
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two to A; it would then be incumbent upon him to look through the index
of granters for deeds executed by A. His attention would be directed to
the deed from A to B, which on a casual inspection would appear to affect
only lot one, in which X is not interested. Should he be expected to examine
that deed or its record so thoroughly that i1i the light of the circumstances
(some of which may very well not appear except outside the instruments
and records) he should realize that there was an equitable restriction on
A's remaining lot two? Right here is where the two lines of authority
diverge. Against the view approved by the principal case it may be urged
that a tremendous burden is placed on the searcher of titles, whether he be
prospective purchaser, attorney, or abstracter. On the other hand, it may
very truly be said that the efficacy of efforts to restrict a given area will be
very much increased by following such doctrine.
It was said above that the Michigan court unnecessarily gave its approval
to the doctrine announced. It was unnecessary because the defendant in the
case-the one who occupied the position of X in the case supposed-had
only, the equitable interest of a contract vendee. As between B and X, both
having mere equities, B's priority of time gives him the favored position
which he preserved in the principal case by taking all the steps required by
the law to preserve such priority, namely, recording. The case should not
have been decided on the matter of notice.
R. W. A.

